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Phenomenological Perspectives on Time and Affectivity in the Musical Work of Art

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“Even if we were naïve realists and believed that all sensible qualities of objects given in sensible perception constitute the real properties of physical objects and that, therefore, a grouping of sounds is something real, we would still not be able to regard the musical work as a real object.”

Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity*

I.

There is a wide range of phenomenological approaches to musical experience,¹ considering that many issues – methodological,² epistemological,³ and even issues related to the practice⁴ or to the psychology of music⁵ – are studied in a phenomenological light. We could even claim that the terms “phenomenology” or “phenomenological analysis” are often used in a rather schematic manner to designate the pre-reflective experience of music as such – what we could designate with Laurence Ferrara “the a priori reverence for the human element in music” or the fact that “music is imbued with a human presence”,⁶ often with no clear reference to phenomenology’s philosophical origins and affiliations.⁷

What is also true is that phenomenology does not always appear to be in best possible terms with other major interpretative „paradigms“ within the contemporary philosophy of music, and the tension is not always easy to overcome.⁸ Still, it is quite clear that phenomenology’s main contributions to modern epistemology – its pronounced anti-representationalism,⁹ its emphasis on intuition, its renewed understanding of space and time – are closely related to artistic experience.¹⁰ Contemporary phenomenology is well-known for being one of the fierce opponents to

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modern representationalism, that is, to the subject-object bipolarity as the primary matrix for all types of relations to the world, epistemic or not. Aesthetic representation refers to the way the human subject captures discrete entities in space and time and represents them in memory or projects them in imagination. Phenomenologists have elaborated a model for experiencing art in ways which challenge the primacy of representation and its subjectivist background, thus differentiating between aesthetic objects and artworks. Moreover, for a number of them, the “rhythm” of intentional consciousness is tied up to its “thymos”, its affective dimension, which is not to be reduced to the subject’s expression of feelings and emotions.

A clearly distinct subfield, in the wider context of music aesthetics and the philosophy of music, is that of the ontology of musical works. The approaches are numerous and the recent relevant literature is considerable.¹¹ Nonetheless, to talk about a phenomenologically inspired account of the musical work as a kind of artwork sounds less familiar to the ears of philosophers of music, musicologists, music aestheticians and even to those of professional philosophers. The presence of phenomenological studies in the field of the ontology of artworks, in our case of musical works, if we compare it for example to those on music perception, is significantly lesser.¹² Mainly this has to do with a misunderstanding concerning phenomenology’s relation to music, as to art in general, due to the primacy of epistemological considerations regarding phenomenological knowledge. In fact, phenomenologists have elaborated a model for experiencing art in ways which challenge the primacy of representation and its subjectivist background, thus differentiating, in an ontological perspective, between aesthetic objects and artworks.

As far as music is concerned, things are far different than what is widely believed. Despite the alleged predominance of the visual arts in phenomenological aesthetics, there has been right from the start intense phenomenological interest in music as a field of philosophical inquiry. Music is present in the works of phenomenologists in two rather distinct manners; either in the way of an explicit phenomenological account of musical works (Roman Ingarden, Alfred Schütz) or in a more implicit, yet powerful, manner. In Martin Heidegger, the inner relation of Dasein’s temporality to tonality or attunement (*Stimmung*) first in *Being and Time* and then in later writings, such as the 1936 *Contributions to Philosophy*, shows how

significant the metaphor of musical tonality is for his understanding of Dasein's relation to Being.

The key figure for phenomenology's early years is *Carl Stumpf*, a student of Franz Brentano, immersed in psychology, music, and phenomenology, who became acquainted with Brentano's younger student Edmund Husserl. Husserl was certainly influenced by the writer of *Tonpsychologie* (1883, 1890). In fact, the founder of the journal *Beiträge zur Akoustik und Musikwissenschaft* (1898) already applied to musical perception the most fundamental principle of phenomenological research, that is, the examination of experience as it appears without reducing it to its analytical components. In our paper, we will try first to consider "phenomenological time" as a factor not just of actual musical experience of and for a subject – a composer, a performer, a listener - but as a particular mode of being of the musical work itself, especially as it is examined in the work of the leading Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden.

II.

It is often argued that there is no talk about art and artworks in Husserl.¹³ Nevertheless, contrary to what is often argued, the vivid interest in art and aesthetics has been contemporary to the historical emergence of the phenomenological movement.¹⁴ Many studies in music aesthetics and phenomenology of music have his analyses, especially those on time-consciousness, as a starting point. Husserl uses in many instances musical themes - sound, melody - to illustrate his phenomenological discourse on time.¹⁵ This could also be viewed as a sign of what Don Ihde designated as the "auditory turn" in contemporary phenomenology.¹⁶

A specific trend within the early phenomenological aesthetics has been that of the Göttingen circle of Edmund Husserl's students – Adolf Reinach, Waldemar Conrad, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein, Alexandre Koyré, Hans Lipps, last but not least, Roman Ingarden¹⁷ – who focused on eidetic research and the search for essences of all kinds (mathematical, natural, legal or artistic). What comes to the center of the Göttingen phenomenologists is the ontological problem of reality viewed within the perspective of Husserl's 1901 *Logical Investigations*.¹⁸ This is a kind of "ontological phenomenology", which focuses on a "Realontologie" in H. Conrad-

Curtius's terms.¹⁹ The persistence of the 1901 work on a so called realist position against Husserl's later modifications of his original positions, mainly from the 1913 *Ideas* on, as well as its attack on positivism and psychologism were the driving forces of the Göttingen School, which eventually led it to a clear demarcation from Husserl himself.²⁰ As for the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, on whom we will focus in this paper, is concerned, he was most certainly dedicated to a "realism of the essences", which made him engage himself right from the start of his phenomenological journey an anti-idealist, as well as anti-subjectivist and anti-psychologist position.²¹ His alliance to a strong realism of the platonic genre, which was typical of the members to the Göttingen group despite their diverse interests and priorities, witnessed also his unaltered affinity to Brentano's analysis of intentionality to which was initiated by his teacher, Kazimierz Twardowski.²²

One of Ingarden's most daring enterprises is his cutting off of ontology from the body of philosophy, which was dominated, even under the auspices of his teacher and fellows in phenomenology, by the primacy of epistemology. It is in the context of this investigation that the old polemic between idealism and realism is posed in new terms.²³ Starting with Husserl's analysis of "essences" in the *Logical Investigations*²⁴, Ingarden goes on to expose different kinds of entities – this is the case for his *Habilitationsschrift* on *Essentielle Fragen* (1925), which gained the interest of eminent analytic philosophers, such as Gilbert Ryle,²⁵ as well for his work of life *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, started already in 1925 (published first in Polish in 1947, then in German in 1964).²⁶ We could designate his main ontological thesis with P. Limido-Heulot as a sort of "ontological pluralism".²⁷

It is Ingarden's "ontological pluralism", especially in its mature form in the *Controversy* book, that has intrigued many ontologists with no necessary alliance with phenomenology, who enter into conversation with him by defending a refined, metaphysics-free, "new realism". In *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* Roderick Chisholm sides clearly with Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology while discussing his views on "intentional inexistence" in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874) regarding the difference between "concrete individual" and "fictitious" objects.²⁸ He then goes on to criticize Husserl's overcoming of Brentano's descriptive psychology in an idealistic direction. On this occasion, he mentions not Ingarden himself, but one of the first representatives of the Polish School who introduced Brentano to Poland, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, who was connected to Brentano

through Ingarden's teacher Twardowski. Chisholm refers to Ingarden's *Controversy* book, with special reference to his account of time and the distinction between "events" and "processes", on many occasions.²⁹ However interesting the *Controversy* book – especially its first part (engl. transl. from parts of *Der Streit* as *Time and Modes of Being* in 1964) which focuses on the problem of time - might be for our discussion by showing the relevance of Ingarden's phenomenological ontology for the contemporary metaphysics of time, it will carry us away from the core issue of this paper so we will come back to it shortly later on, in the specific context of the analysis of the musical work.³⁰

III.

How is the "phenomenological time" of musical works to be perceived from Ingarden's ontological perspective? Before tackling this issue, let us make a short detour from a late (1969) conference paper by Ingarden, where he discusses phenomenological aesthetics.³¹ Ingarden observes that there are two major trends in aesthetics in general, a subjectivist and an objectivist one. Subjectivism in aesthetics focuses on aesthetic experience (creation and reception of the aesthetic object), whereas objectivism inquires into the distinct kinds of "objects" which are the works of art. In the history of aesthetics, there has been most of the times an oscillation between the "subjective" and the "objective" side of the artistic experience. Ingarden argues that, in his *Poetics*, Aristotle seeks to clarify the nature of the artwork, but in the case of tragedy, for example, by explaining through its effects, *katharsis*, Aristotle fails to understand it.³² As for modern aesthetics, if its "subjectivist" trend tends to predominate in Baumgarten and Kant, Hegel on his side puts "*das Kunstschöne*" in priority, without nevertheless succeeding to discover the connection between the "objective" and the "subjective" component of the artistic experience. This tension is transfused in the field of phenomenology, which from its birth faces the problem of subjectivism in knowledge in all its forms: the form under which this problem is met is that of psychologism: in Gustav Theodor Fechner, Theodor Lipps,³³ and Johann Volkelt, art is "psychologized". Especially as far as music is concerned, the same psychologist trend was evident in the works of Ernst Kurth and Géza Révész who by going even further in the direction of Carl Stumpf's empirical approach to music perception first elaborated a music psychology.³⁴ After the publication of the *Logical*

Investigations, where Husserl criticized severely Lipps' psychologism, many of Lipps' students, such as Moriz Geiger, abandoned him to form the Munich phenomenology circle.

The above notwithstanding, the first phenomenologists of music (Moritz Geiger, Fritz Kaufmann) were carried away, to some degree, by psychologism; the sole exception to the rule was Waldemar Conrad, who, following Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, viewed works of art "ideal objects". Waldemar Conrad's analysis of the artistic genres is of great importance, because he was the first to get into a phenomenological account of musical works following the method of the *Logical Investigations*. Conrad proceeds to many distinctions, which were conducted further by Roman Ingarden, such as the stratification of artworks and the distinction between the work of art as existing in space and time, as a *wirkende Kunstwerk*, and as an ideal object.³⁵ Conrad claims that what a phenomenologist studies is not just the specific musical work, e.g. a symphony *hic et nunc*, when "concretized" as a "*wirkende Kunstwerk* [operating work of art]", but the symphony as an object which represents the intended ideal object. Thus, the symphony is not a part of the real world, it is not a real object.³⁶ But if works of art are ideal, then they are timeless and Waldemar Conrad was the first to get into the analysis of works of different arts, including musical works. In a certain sense, then, Ingarden's theory of artworks stands inbetween those two extremes: the one being that of "psychologizing" artworks and the other that of handling them as ideal, eternal entities, such as those of mathematics and logic. For Ingarden - and this is the a perennial theme in his thought - works of art are neither real, nor ideal objects; in fact, he designates them as "purely intentional" objects, by referring them to what are merely intentional objects, in Husserl's terms. In the fifth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl speaks of intentional mental events ("acts") that have an object, and intentional acts, such as the acts of imagination, whose object does not exist. In the case where the object does not exist, but only the act exists (*die Intention ...existiert, aber nicht der Gegenstand*) with its being directed in some way, then the object is a "*bloss intentionaler Gegenstand*".³⁷ In this sense, a "purely intentional object" is an object that exists only to the extent that it is posited by an intentional act of consciousness.

In order to fully grasp what Ingarden means and how this affects his account of the temporality of musical works, let us move back to the 1920s, when we first find a complete phenomenological analysis of artworks in him. Ingarden's essay "Das

Musikwerk”, which is a part of his *Investigations into the Ontology of Art: Musical Work. Image. Architecture* (published first in Polish in 1933, then in German in a revised version in 1961), started already in 1928 and were supposed to supplement his analyses of the literary work.³⁸ It is precisely in the context of the 1931 book on *The Literary Work of Art* that Ingarden first defines artworks as “purely intentional objectivities”: “By a purely intentional objectivity we understand an objectivity that is in a figurative sense “created” by a act of consciousness or by a manifold of acts or, finally, by a formation (e.g. a word meaning, a sentence) exclusively on the basis of an immanent, original, or only conferred intentionality and has, in the given objectivities, the source of its existence and its total essence”.³⁹

Ingarden’s understanding of the artworks as intentional objects, based on the clear-cut distinction between ideal and intentional objects by advancing, as he clearly states in his “Introduction to the German Edition” of *The Literary Work of Art* some reflexions on the objectivities of the cultural world that Husserl left unexamined. Ingarden states here a problematic passage from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), where Husserl asks the “painful question” of “how these idealities can take on spatio-temporally restricted existence, in the cultural world (which must surely be considered as real, as included in the spatio-temporal universe), real *existence*, in the form of historical temporality, as theories and sciences”. Ingarden’s answer to this question regarding “the mode of existence of objectivities represented in a literary work” is that: “formations of this sort should be excluded, not only from the realm of idealities in the strict sense, but from the real world as well”.⁴⁰ In order to elaborate what we could designate as a phenomenological ontology of the artworks, Ingarden refers back to the *Logical Investigations*, as well as to the *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology*, from which nevertheless he keeps his distance. Moreover, he introduces a series of new ontological categories especially in reference to the mode of being of “purely intentional objects”: the latter are both transcendent with respect to the corresponding acts of consciousness, a theme taken from Husserl’s *Ideas* (§§ 41, 42), and, at the same time, ontically dependent with respect to acts of consciousness.⁴¹

The first kind of artwork, after the literary work of art, which Ingarden decides to investigate is the musical work. He starts by offering a thick description of its mode of being. First of all, the musical work has to be distinguished from its performances. Performances are intra-temporal objects, that is, physical objects in the form of

acoustic processes or auditory perceptions; they are located in space and possess unique qualitative elements: “Every real object, process, or event has a spatiotemporal location or duration. Whenever I confront a real object, it is here and now, where I am present. A performance of the B Minor Sonata is undoubtedly occurring here and now, either when I play or when I listen to a performance of it, but we cannot say this of the sonata itself. This is so irrespective of the fact that the “now” varies and may apply equally to the performance by Chopin himself when he played the work publicly for the first time”.⁴² In contrast to performances, musical works dispose of a temporal structure *immanent* to the work itself: “a musical work, given as an aesthetic object on the basis of a particular performance, is not a real event lasting during the performance and for that reason cannot designate any other objects or processes occurring in the real world.”⁴³

As a finished work the musical work’s coming into being as well as its continuing existence are not identical to those of its performances. Nonetheless, there is always a reciprocal modification between the musical work itself and its performances: “During every performance of the work there doubtless takes place a peculiar reciprocal modification of the temporal colorations immanent in the work and the colorations of the temporal elements of the time concretely experienced by the listener”.⁴⁴ It is clear that, in this context, Ingarden refers exclusively to renditions by a musician and not to their repetition by means of recordings, the reason being that, contrary to the identity of musical works, recordings are fully committed to another ontological category, that of likeness.⁴⁵ Later on in his study, he will argue that only the score sets the limits to what remains identical in a musical work, whereas the phonographic recordings do not change much to our philosophical approach to it.⁴⁶ Moreover, for Ingarden, the musical work has no perceptual givenness, in Husserl’s terms); it has no definitive location in space and last, but not least, it forms a unique entity.

In fact, the main feature of a musical work’s mode of being is that of being a “purely intentional” object: “Neither the musical work itself nor any part of it is something “individual” in the sense in which this term is used of any real object. On the basis of its performances, we apprehend, in a purely aesthetic attitude, both from the individual tones and from the musical formations of a higher stage, only *pure qualities*, not individualized by the particular mode of existence of real being. When we hear a certain individual performance but attend to the work itself, we abstract, so

to say, from the mode of being – as individuals – of the tones and tone formations which we are just then hearing and which belong to the performance: we extract only the pure qualities of the tone formations from the individual concretum we are just then hearing”.⁴⁷ To a certain extent, the musical work is not just one of the many kinds of intentional objects, but the intentional object *par excellence*, because since it is the kind of artwork which is as remote to “real objects” as possible: “There is perhaps no other category of works of art which form, to the same degree as the musical work, such a perfectly closed-off whole in themselves. There is present in its content – so far as it is a purely musical work – no reference and no relation to the real world at all. For this reason it is useful to compare works of music with works of other arts”.⁴⁸

Because of the musical work’s simplicity and its absence of a stratified structure, to the extent that it possesses only one stratum (*einschichtig*): “The musical work forms a whole whose unity and the closeness with which its elements are joined together are incomparably higher than is possible in any literary work”.⁴⁹ This unity of a higher order is not irrelevant to music’s being a purely temporal art. It is clear then that the uniqueness of the musical work doesn’t lie in its spatiotemporal concreteness, but in the way in which the “pure qualities of the tone formations”⁵⁰ emerge as a whole that is absolutely unique. Echoing Bergson’s eloquent reference of the “many-colored continuum of qualities”, Ingarden discovers in the musical work the closest analogon to the “qualitative individualization”, to the “purely qualitative particularity” – formulations with clear Bergsonian overtones – which is the mode of being of the intentional states of consciousness in general. But the particular mode of its individualization is strictly dependent upon its temporalizing mode: “Whoever is able, on the basis of hearing a certain concrete performance, to attain in aesthetic perception the musical work itself also attains its qualitative particularity and realizes that its supraparticular character vis-à-vis the spatio-temporal particularity of real objects”.⁵¹ The musical work is not a supra-individual and, thus, supra-temporal entity in the way ideal entities are, as Waldemar Conrad suggested, since it originates in the creative mind of the composer.

Yet, the process of its creation by the artist lies outside the focus of phenomenological inquiry. The musical work opens to us the whole of its parts or “phases” simultaneously and, in this sense, someone would contrast it to “real processes”, such as performances; thus, the work itself is not determined by the

“temporal colorations”, in Bergson’s terms, of its individual performances. The simultaneity of the multiple parts (“phases”) of a finished musical work “in longitudinal section” makes Ingarden speak of it as a quasi-temporal object, which possess an immanent temporality proper to it: “although the work is free of those colorations of the time phases in which the individual performances take place, the work’s individual parts (its “phases”) exhibit specific “temporal colorations” which are immanent in the work itself and are exclusively a function of the filling-out of the phases of the work itself”.⁵² In other words, only the elements of the work itself, especially those of a tonal nature – the musical motifs such as the harmonic-melodic units of meaning (*Sinneinheiten*) – serve to convert the successive temporal phases of the musical work into a dense whole. Ingarden dedicates a wonderful phenomenological analysis to the way “temporal colorations” immanent to the work itself intermingle with those of the listener.⁵³

Another important feature of Ingarden’s phenomenological analysis is that he distinguishes between the acoustic and the non-acoustic elements of the musical work. If acoustic elements, mainly tone formations, are absolutely individual unrepeatable features, non-acoustic formations are equally important in the musical work’s constitution. In fact, the temporality immanent to the work itself is its foremost non-acoustic element and additionally the one upon which the rest of its elements, for instance, the movement of its parts, depend. It is this mode of temporality that Ingarden brings close to Bergson’s “durée pure” as well as to Husserl’s phenomenology of time: “what is decisive is that this time is organized; that is, in the flow of musical time individual unitary segments stand out, which differ structurally and qualitatively according to the way in which time is organized in the given work; it does not flow monotonously, but at a certain dynamically structured pace. It pulsates, as it were – if this new comparison is more apt – and this pulsing takes place in different qualitatively, rhythmically, and agogically determined ways, according to the rhythm of the work (or of a particular part), to the tempo in which it unfolds, and finally according to the tone formations themselves and their structures”.⁵⁴ The “pulsating nature” of musical time witnesses Ingarden’s debt to Bergson’s analysis of the “durée pure” as a purely qualitative, that is, heterogeneous and discontinuous time.⁵⁵

Ingarden goes even further to relate the immanent temporality of the musical work to its value qualities, but leaves the question open.⁵⁶ Thus, for Ingarden, the

musical work's temporality is of utmost importance for comprehending its mode of being as a purely intentional object: "As an object enduring in time, the musical work is still not a temporal object in the same sense in which the term applies to its individual performances. While the separate parts of a performance follow one another *realiter* in definite phases, the parts of the musical composition itself exist simultaneously, as soon as it has been completed...the musical work itself possesses a single "order of succession" of parts and a single quasi-temporal structure, which is quite independent of the phases of the concretely experienced intersubjective time."⁵⁷ The finished, complete musical work possesses a quasi-temporal quality and is qualified by the simultaneity of its parts which form it as a whole, a theme taken once more from Husserl's third *Logical Investigation*, where he discusses the parts-whole problematic. Ingarden will return to the latter later on in his *Investigations*, while discussing the existence of gaps and pauses in relation to the unity of musical works.⁵⁸ It is clear, then, that the specific supra-temporal character of musical works is to be distinguished from both the objective, intersubjectively experienced phenomenal time of "real" entities and from the atemporality of "ideal" entities.⁵⁹

IV.

Let us now draw a line between Ingarden's ontological restructuring of the region of „objects“ and their temporal constitution and Husserl's account of it. We will first highlight some key points of Husserl's analysis with respect to phenomenological time, which could have a significant impact upon the perception and understanding of musical works. We will then turn to his less known later manuscripts on time, which for many phenomenologists introduce significant modifications to his earlier views on time. What is also worth noting that Ingarden does not take advantage of Husserl's later works on time, of which he was nevertheless aware⁶⁰, due probably to his parting from phenomenological transcendentalism. Nevertheless, Husserl's later works on time, despite their apparent complexity, present us with a new opportunity to find answers to questions regarding the nature of temporality other than the ones given in the 1904-1905 courses on time-consciousness. Though Ingarden was one of the first to set forth the difficulties inherent to a phenomenological treatment of time, in his

1921 thesis on *Intuition und Intellekt bei Henri Bergson*, it is quite obvious that he didn't follow Husserl along the path of his questioning on time till the mid-thirties⁶¹.

It is widely known that Husserl rejects "objective time", that is, the commonly accepted idea that intentional consciousness is constituted by punctually isolated now-points. This is the specific sense in which Husserl comprehends "temporal objects", that is objects which do not stand simply isolated in the "presence-time" (*Präsenzzeit*) of separate psychic acts, "that are not only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in themselves"⁶². Going back to Brentano's theory of the origin of time, Husserl remarks: "When a melody sounds, for example, the individual tone does not utterly disappear with the cessation of the stimulus or of the neural movement it excites. When the new tone is sounding, the preceding one has not disappeared without leaving a trace. If it had, we would be quite incapable of noticing the relations among the successive tones; in each moment we would have a tone, or perhaps an empty pause in the interval between the sounding of two tones, but never the representation of a melody"⁶³. The "flow" proper to temporal consciousness is the same nature as that of musical perception, e.g. that of perceiving a tone or a melody, which, as such, are "immanent temporal objects": "The tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the *impressional* consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new *retentional* consciousness. Going along the flow or with it, we have a continuous series of retentions pertaining to the beginning-point. Beyond that, however, each earlier point of this series is adumbrated in its turn as a *now* in the sense of retention. Thus a continuity of retentional modifications attaches itself to each of these retentions, and this continuity itself is again an actually present point that is retentionally adumbrated"⁶⁴. Husserl's interest in the temporal qualities of musical experience are apparent in the 1905 *Lessons on internal time-consciousness*: musical entities such as tones and melodies, more than any other kinds of objects, must confront time, they "appear" in immanent time, they are "given" in a continual flow, in a running-off continuity. The musical "paradigm", that is, the tone and melody as immanent temporal objects serve for Husserl to illustrate this running-off continuity, e.g. in the phenomenological description of "retentional modification" or "primary memory", in the case of a tone's fading-away, or in that of the reproduction of temporal objects or "secondary memory" (*Phantasie*), in the case of recalling a melody recently heard at a concert⁶⁵. Here Husserl speaks here of "fusion" and "temporal fringes" to explicate

the way in which a past melody is “given” to us: “the extension of the melody is not only given point by point in the extension of the act of perceiving, but the unity of the retentive consciousness still “holds on to” the elapsed tones themselves in consciousness and progressively brings about the unity of the consciousness that is related to the unitary temporal object, to the melody”⁶⁶.

Husserl’s analysis of musical entities as immanent temporal objects are omnipresent in Ingarden’s ontological account of the musical work. Still, what remains to be thought is whether Husserl’s extensive revisions of his initial account of phenomenological time could bring useful insights to the study of the temporality of the musical work⁶⁷. Those later modifications of his initial reflections on time could provide us with useful insights for musical temporality as well⁶⁸. As it is often suggested the new element in those analyses is the constituting function of time-consciousness as *self-constituting*, which brings forth the founding of acting intentionality on a deeper layer, that of a “passive synthesis”⁶⁹. This new dimension brings along other issues to be found in the earlier writings on time, such as the role of the “living present” (*lebendige Gegenwart*), of “affection” (*Affektion*), its relation to action (*Aktion*) and its role in the self-constituting activity, that is in the transcendental “self-temporalization” (*Selbstzeitigung*) of the subject⁷⁰. Those later writings, which put forth themes such as that of the instincts (*Instinkt-Ich*), of sleep and dream, also of the “affective power” (*affektive Kraft*)⁷¹ of lived experiences which ensures the unity of the temporal continuum would ask for a “paradigm” quite different than that of melody, as in the 1905 *Lessons*⁷². However, even from the middle period of Husserl’s writings on time, in the Bernau manuscripts, there are obscurities and ambiguities which have to do with the way in which temporality affects transcendental subjectivity⁷³. This makes things more difficult as far as a re-evaluation of his initial reflections on musical objects as specifically temporal objects. In any case, Ingarden’s successive accounts of artworks do not seem to allude to those later writings, and this is the sign of a clear hermeneutic advantage of Husserl’s phenomenology for the temporality of musical works. Little research has been done in this direction, relating his earlier use of the “musical paradigm” for explicating phenomenological time to his later revised elaborations of it⁷⁴.

V.

From what precedes it becomes clear that the two main philosophical references for comprehending Ingarden's idea of musical artworks as "quasi-temporal" are Bergson and Husserl, in this exact order. Bergson is apparently the first to initiate Ingarden into a new approach to time, that of the "durée concrète", which he communicated to Husserl while preparing his thesis on *Intuition and Intellekt bei Bergson* under his supervision (defended in 1921). The problem here, which originates in Bergson's separation between "*la durée pure*" and "*le temps*" and, respectively, between intuition and intelligence, is that of "*konstituierte Zeit und ihrer konstitution in dem ursprünglichen "inneren" Bewusstsein*".⁷⁵ While Ingarden's repeated allusions to the qualitative and heterogeneous nature of musical time witnesses his debt to Bergson's analysis in *Matière et mémoire* and elsewhere, he often states his preference for Husserl's analysis of time, arguing that Husserl is the first to differentiate between physical time and a constituted, qualitative time within what Bergson designated as "*le temps*".⁷⁶ This is much more evident in the original Polish version of the text, whereas Husserl is not explicitly mentioned in the 1962 German edition.

In his 1905 *Lessons on the Internal Consciousness of Time* Husserl rejects "objective time", that is, the widely accepted idea that intentional consciousness is constituted by punctually isolated now-points; in fact a temporal extension goes beyond the mere perceiving of the "now-phase" of the object, what we would designate with Klaus Held as "a field of presence".⁷⁷ What is also obvious in the 1905 *Lessons* is Husserl's interest in the temporal qualities of musical experience. In fact, musical entities such as tones and melodies, more than any other kinds of objects, must confront time, as they "appear" in immanent time, they are "given" in a continual flow, in a running-off continuity. A tone, a melody or a cohesive part of a melody are the examples of "temporal objects" Husserl uses to illustrate his phenomenological enterprise: "we hear the melody, that is, we perceive it, for hearing is indeed perceiving. However, the first tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then the third, and so on. Must we not say: When the second tone sounds, I hear *it*, but I no longer hear the first tone, etc.? In truth, then, I do not hear the melody but only the single present tone...Therefore at any given time I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in smallest punctual part perception, and in

further part expectation”.⁷⁸ In fact, “memory–perception–expectation”, phenomenologically reformulated as “retention–(originary) impression–protention” are the constituent moments of the continuum of internal time-consciousness.⁷⁹ Husserl’s triad of phenomenologically constituted time is omnipresent in Ingarden’s account of the musical work. While discussing the problem of unity of the musical work, Ingarden returns to the issue of musical time, which is distinct from the “single musical now”, and refers to Husserl’s account of the phenomenal structures of *retention* and *protention*: “In the case of musical phrases or products constructed from a series of phrases and extending over a long period of musical time, whose sounding aspect covers several moments and realizes itself in them, one requires in perception not only retention but additionally a certain specific palpable expectation of that which is about to occur, which Husserl correlatively called “protention”...”.⁸⁰

Those larger time formations form solid and consistent totalities, for instance, melodies, within the boundaries of the musical work. In his *Cognition of the Artwork* (1937, in Polish), Ingarden analyzes once more “phenomenal, qualitatively determined” versus “objective” time, time measured by the clock, in terms of “temporal perspective” about facts which are of three types – events, processes, objects enduring in time: “The events given in recollection under the “foreshortenings” of temporal perspective need not be finished events. In a process which is still developing at the present moment, the phases which are already past appear in analogous manifestations of temporal perspective, although we do not imagine them in special acts of recollection and although they are encompassed in part by active memory and even by retention. Further every process is perceived as a process only because the phases which have just passed come to givenness in active memory or in recollection in the manifestations of temporal perspective”.⁸¹ Echoing the Bergsonian “*durée*”, Ingarden speaks of “phenomenal time” in terms of a “qualitative, unrepeatable coloring”: “The concretely experienced ‘moments’ differ from one another because of their different qualitative, unique, and, as Bergson rightly states, unrepeatable coloring. This coloring is clearly determined primarily by what fills the moment, that is, by what is happening in the experiencing subject’s sphere of experience. The coloring is also determined in part by a certain echo of what has just passed and an announcement of what may be coming. But two factors are decisive in making it a single moment, a single now: first, uniform qualitative

coloring; second, the actuality of everything which has this coloring and fills the now, although it is framed by retention and protention”.⁸²

Still, Ingarden goes a step further than auditory retention and protention to what he designates as “living (active) memory” that is, the presence of past phases as reminiscences, but also the emotional quality which creates a unity of atmosphere, which in essence amounts to the unity of the musical work. It is through the pauses between the parts of a musical work that the emotional aura of the work emerges in its full strength: “The melancholy lyricism of the Adagio represents a descent through several layers into the depth of emotion, a descent not possible without a struggle, were it not preceded by both the pathos and the vitality of the preceding movement and their gradual dissipation, so that we are still under the impression of the first part but, in a supervening calm, are becoming ready to receive a new phase of the work with a different general atmosphere”.⁸³ Ingarden distinguishes clearly the immanent emotional quality of the work from the “*Gefühlsästhetik*”, which is considered as an outcome of psychologism: emotions are not to be taken as something psychic, residing within the listener, but as a qualitative feature of the work itself. He equally criticizes musical formalism’s, for instance, Hanslick’s denial of emotions in music. Several emotions raised by musical works can be comprehended by analogy to our individual emotions, while others are proper to the music works and cannot be substituted by those of another form of art: “There are, moreover, emotional qualities than can be brought to intuitive givenness in their particular concrete *Gestalt* only by music, so that we have no name whatever for them, since in the rest of our experiences we find no analogue for them at all”.⁸⁴ In fact, this is one of the most controversial points made by Ingarden: the incommensurability of emotions in our experience with those raised by music. The feelings or other mental experiences which the musical work expresses do not belong to the work itself.⁸⁵ By relating “emotion” to “movement” Ingarden points out that pure musical movement brings along emotional phenomena which are not ontically transcendent in reference to the work, but rather immanent to it.⁸⁶

Nonetheless, Ingarden’s account of the musical work elaborates a series of other issues which codetermine its being a “qualitative entity” or a purely intentional, supra-individual, quasi-temporal object.⁸⁷ It is against the background of those basic assumptions that we should consider the internal value of the musical work itself, its intentional dependence upon its score, its intentional directness back to its composer,

its intentional dependence upon its ontic foundations and last, but not least, the controversial relation between its “schematic” nature, that is, its indeterminacy and its many “concretizations”.⁸⁸

VI.

Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology of the musical work proves that the philosophical – ontological, epistemological, anthropological theses – on music as art, but music itself can give useful insights in major philosophical issues, such as the very constitution of artifacts human intentionality copes with. In fact, the “musical paradigm” is useful when dealing with ontological and meta-ontological questions. This is due to the fact that the musical work is a unique example of an artifact which is not a structure in time, a structure that constitutes itself in time, but is a temporal structure, that is, it constitutes itself in a temporal manner.⁸⁹ We should reject the idea that music simply applies what philosophy conceives of as true, due mainly to the prevailing foundationalist-intellectualist thesis. In fact, the opposite is true: as Andrew Bowie claims, “music’s resistance to philosophy” is deeply rooted in philosophical modernity.⁹⁰ In the case of contemporary phenomenology, the “musical paradigm” helps a lot in overcoming many long-standing metaphysical prejudices and scrutinize the philosophical tradition both in ontology and in epistemology, for instance, by modifying and updating the apparatus of our ontological categories, as Ingarden suggests in his phenomenological ontology of the artworks. In fact, his “ontological pluralism” should be viewed in this way, offering a whole set of ontological concepts and categories and, thus, forming an integral system for investigating phenomenologically musical works.

In conclusion, there have been numerous objections regarding the alleged inadequacy of Ingarden’s theory of musical works with respect to confronting actual problems of musical *praxis*. Some of those are his insistence on the finished nature of musical artworks, his strict separation between musical artworks and musical performances, his rejection of new musical technologies. Still, what remains his great contribution to the contemporary discussion on the ontology of musical artworks is his refinement of what we will call with Julian Dodds the “categorical question” as to the nature of musical works, that is the question of the kind of existents those works are.⁹¹ The always tentative answer to this question paves the way for answering many

other related questions and, first of all, the question regarding the temporality of the musical work. Ingarden's ontology of musical works has one big advantage, due mainly to its phenomenological inclination, that is, its dislike for metaphysical dualism and, consecutively, for bifurcations, such as ideal/real, formal/material, eternal/temporal regarding the type of entities musical works may be: "The fact that a musical work is a cultural product does not settle the question of its ontic status, for of course the question is wider than this and not confined to musical works. It includes all cultural products and not necessarily artistic ones... With regard to all these, we have to consider in what way they exist, if they exist at all, and it is doubtful whether these works of art exist in the same way as mountains, rivers, plants, animals, and human beings".⁹² As for the actual position of Ingarden's theory within the field of the contemporary ontology of musical works, it is clearly apart from both "ontological Platonism", for instance, the "type/token theory" (Dodds 2008),⁹³ and "historical particularism" in its many faces – "structuralist-contextualist" in J. Levinson,⁹⁴ "social-constructivist" in Stephen Davies,⁹⁵ or "perdurantist" in David Caplan, Stefano Predelli, G. Rohrbaugh and others.⁹⁶

In this respect, Amie Thomasson's views on the "meta-ontology" of musical artworks are worth noting. Thomasson departs from Ingarden's general ontological thesis regarding the nature of artifacts, especially his "dependence-thesis".⁹⁷ Her analyses provide us with a much nuanced approach to what we should expect from an Ingarden-inspired ontological analysis that proves its phenomenological of artworks to be anything but dated for contemporary philosophy of music and musicology. Thomasson takes as a starting point Ingarden's theory of musical artworks as purely intentional objects.⁹⁸ She accounts for Ingarden's making artworks, such as musical works, derive from some psychophysical acts of the composer, the performer or the listener, and, at same time, depend generically upon some external ontic foundation of some kind (copies of scores or individual performances), without nevertheless losing its "indeterminacy", that is, its "qualitative" features which render him a purely intentional object, against all attempts to reduce it to a "real" object. In the creation of purely intentional objects, what the acts of consciousness do is add intentional features to consciousness-independent, real objects.⁹⁹ This is the kind of ontologically-informed, yet metaphysically unconventional answer to both Platonic idealism and to different varieties of ontological particularisms concerning musical

works that Ingardian phenomenology could inspire – even if there may still be much work to be done.

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¹ For systematic studies which focus on the interaction between music aesthetics and the phenomenology of music: Augusto Mazzoni, *La musica nell'estetica fenomenologica* (Milano: Mimesis, 2004); D. Angelucci, *L'oggetto poetico. Conrad, Ingarden, Hartmann* (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2004).

² Philip Batstone, "Musical Analysis as Phenomenology", *Perspectives of New Music* 7, no. 2 (1969): 94-110; Friedrich Jaeger, "Systematik oder Phänomenologie? Überlegungen zu den Grundlagen des Fachs Musiktheorie", *Musik und Bildung* 9, no. 3 (1977): 133-141; Lawrence Ferrara, *Philosophy and the Analysis of Music: Bridges to Musical Sound, Form, and Reference* (Westpoint CT: Greenwood Press, 1991); Bruce Ellis Benson, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: A Phenomenology of Music* (Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

³ Here the question of music perception is the prevailing one: F. J. Smith, *The Experiencing of Musical Sound: Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music* (London: Gordon and Breach, 1979); Alfred Pike, "The Phenomenological Approach to Musical Perception", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 27, no. 2 (1966): 247-54; idem, "Foundational Aspects of Musical Perception: A Phenomenological Analysis", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 34, no. 3 (1974): 429-34; Laurence Ferrara, "Phenomenology as a Tool for Musical Analysis", *The Musical Quarterly* 70 (1984): 355-73; Thomas Clifton, *Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); David Lewin, "Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception", *Music Perception* 3 (1986): 327-92; Marian T. Dura, "The Phenomenology of the Music-Listening Experience", *Arts Education Policy Review* 107, no. 3 (2006): 25-32.

⁴ Jeanette Bicknell, "The Problem of Reference in Musical Quotation: A Phenomenological Approach", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59, no. 2 (2001): 185-91; Laurence Ferrara, "Allowing Oneself to be Moved: A Phenomenology of Musical Evaluation", *Qualitative Evaluation in the Arts* 1 (1981): 125-51. For examples of the application of phenomenology to specific musical works: Ellen J. Burns, "Musical Progeny: The Case of Phenomenology and Music", *Analecta Husserliana*, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, vol. XCII (2006): 57-66.

⁵ F. Joseph Smith, "Toward a Phenomenology of Music: A Musician's Composition Journal", *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 3 (1995): 21-33. Most of the phenomenology-driven analyses of emotion in music take as a starting point not Husserl himself, but other phenomenologists' account of affects, such as Jean-Paul Sartre's *Sketches for a Theory of the Emotions* (1939) and *The Imaginary* (1940); Paul E. Robinson, "Sartre on Music", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 31, no. 4 (1973): 451-57; Philippe Cabestan, "What Is It to Move Oneself Emotionally? Emotion and Affectivity According to Jean-Paul Sartre", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 3, no. 1 (2004): 81-96.

⁶ Laurence Ferrara, "Phenomenology as a Tool for Musical Analysis", 357.

⁷ See among many others: Jean G. Harrell, "Phenomenology of Film Music", *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 14, no. 1, (1980): 23-34; Harris M. Berger, *Metal, Rock, and the Phenomenology of Musical Experience* (Hanover, N.H.: The University Press of New England, 1999); Guy Madison, "Experiencing Groove Induced by Music: Consistency and Phenomenology", *Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 24, no. 4 (2006): 201-8. What lacks from those studies is a consistent methodological account of how phenomenology relates to musical *praxis*.

⁸ I refer to Roger Scruton's criticism of phenomenology in his *Aesthetics of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Also to Lewis Rowell's criticism of Thomas Clifton's pioneering study in: "Review of Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology, by Thomas Clifton", *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* 20, no. 1 (1986): 119. Rowell accuses phenomenology of egocentrism and of focusing too much on the functions of the experiencing subject.

⁹ Edward S. Casey, "Aesthetic Experience", in: *Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics*, eds. Hans-Reiner Sepp, Lester Embree, Contributions to Phenomenology 59 (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer, 2010): 1-7.

¹⁰ Moritz Geiger, *The Significance of Art. A Phenomenological Approach to Aesthetics* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1986); Mikel Dufrenne, *Esthétique et philosophie*, vol. 1 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1976): 53-61; Walter Biemel, *Schriften zur Kunst*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Frommann Holzboog, 1996).

¹¹ See the discussion on the ontological theses about the musical artwork as eternal structural type, indicated type, norm-kind, starting from premisses other than phenomenological: Robert Stecker, "Methodological Questions about the Ontology of Music", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 67, no. 4 (2009): 385-6 (n. 1).

¹² One of the rare exceptions to the predominant analytic ontological as well as meta-ontological discourse on the musical work – by Peter Kivy, Nelson Goodman, Jerry Levinson, Stephen Davies, and others – worth mentioning is that of Amie L. Thomasson, an ontologist trained in the analytic tradition, yet inspired by Roman Ingarden's phenomenological account of artworks, especially of musical works. See her "The Ontology of Art", in: *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics*, ed. Peter Kivy (Malden/Oxford: Blackwell, 2004): 78-92 and her "Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?", *Philosophy Compass* 1, no. 3 (2006): 245-55. We will return to her later on, while discussing Ingarden's account of the musical artwork. Thomasson shows that, while questioning the ontological kind of musical works, Ingarden's phenomenological analyses have many direct, but mostly indirect, connections to the analytic discourse on artworks, thus, building a bridge between the analytic and the continental traditions as far as the ontology of artifacts is concerned.

¹³ Françoise Dastur, "Husserl et la neutralité de l'art", *A la naissance des choses. Art, poésie et philosophie* (Paris: Encre Marine, 2005): 91-110. For Dastur, the phenomenological stance shares with the esthetic stance the same faculty of "desactualization" of appearances. Nevertheless, it is the abandonment of the *Logical Investigations* and their primacy of perception that allows for the phenomenological elaboration of esthetic experience; the 1905 *Lessons on the Internal Time-Consciousness* are the decisive step in this direction. See also Dastur's "L'approche phénoménologique du problème de l'imagination", in: *Husserl*, ed. Jocelyn Benoist (Paris: Cerf, 2008): 105-24. Nevertheless, most phenomenologists' discourse focuses on pictorial arts by taking as a starting point the 1898-1925 posthumously published manuscripts on *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925)*, Dordrecht/Boston: Springer, 2005. In this respect: John Brough, "Art and Artworld: Some Ideas for a Husserlian Aesthetic", in: *Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition*, ed. Robert Sokolowski (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988): 77-93; Pierre Rodrigo, *L'intentionnalité créatrice. Problèmes de phénoménologie et d'esthétique* (Paris: Vrin, 2009): 153-98.

¹⁴ See in this respect: Peter von Moos, *Die deutsche Ästhetik der Gegenwart* (Berlin: Schuster & Loeffler, 1931); Gabriele Scaramuzza, *Le origini dell'estetica fenomenologica* (Padua: Antenore, 1976).

¹⁵ I mention here especially Gérard Granel's masterly analysis of phenomenological time with regard to musical sound and melody: *Le sens du temps et de la perception chez Husserl* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). Granel goes as far as identifying melody to "the phenomenological" itself: "La mélodie est ainsi un exemple porteur d'une signification philosophique évidente : en elle le moment de l'identité ne cesse d'être porté sur les flots de sa constitution, en même temps que le flux ne cesse de déployer l'identité... La mélodie est l'exemple porteur de toutes les analyses des *Leçons sur le temps* parce qu'elle est l'échantillon mondain du phénoménologique comme tel" (p. 57).

¹⁶ "Not only are sounds in the metaphysical tradition secondary, but the inattention to the sounding of things has led to the gradual loss of understanding whole ranges of phenomena which are there to be noted" (*Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound* (Stony Brook N.Y.: State University of New York Press 2007, 2nd ed.), 45). For Ihde, Husserl's phenomenology marks a turn toward the widening of the field of intentionality, which was traditionally limited to visual perception, to include the experiences of hearing and sound. For a recent development of this questioning: Daniel Schmicking, *Hören und Klang: empirisch phänomenologische Untersuchungen* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003). Nevertheless, others have serious objections to this arguing that, despite its pronounced intentions, phenomenology always favours the *Wesensschau* as its privileged mode of access to beings: "Both Husserl and Heidegger, despite the fact that they occasionally deal with sound, still bear witness to the classical tradition that expresses philosophical thought in words which rely heavily on visual metaphor... Phenomenology must yet develop a more convincing attitude towards things heard, i.e., if we must describe them in the terms of continental philosophy, toward *akoumena*." (F. Joseph Smith, "Further Insights into a Phenomenology of Sound", *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 3, no. 2 (1969): 141).

¹⁷ Many members of the Göttingen circle led phenomenological investigations on art with a special interest in ontology: Theodor Conrad, *Definition und Forschungsgehalt der Ästhetik* (Ph.D. diss., University of Munich, 1908), Hedwig Conrad-Martius, “Die Irrealität des Kunstwerks”, *Schriften zur Philosophie*, vol. 3 (Münich: Kösel, 1965): 249-260; Aloys Fischer, *Zur Bestimmung des ästhetischen Gegenstandes*, (Münich: Stein, 1907); Moritz Geiger, “Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses”, *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 1 (1913): 567-684. On the scission between the München-Göttingen and the Freiburg phenomenological schools: E. Avé-Lallemant, “Die Antithese Freiburg-München in der Geschichte der Phänomenologie”, in: *Die Münchener Phänomenologie. Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München, 13-18 April, 1971*, ed. H. Kuhn, E. Avé-Lallemant, R. Gladiador, *Phänomenologica* 65 (Den Haag: Kluwer, 1975): 19-38.

¹⁸ Husserl organized first in the *Logical Investigations* and then in the first volume of the *Ideas* a system of ontological categories of different kinds of objects. By distinguishing between “formal” and “material” essences, Husserl recognizes three material “regions of being”: nature, consciousness and culture (*Geist*). In this respect: David Woodruff Smith, *Husserl* (London-New York: Routledge, 2007): 138, 164, 184 and 157 for a graph representing Husserl’s system of object types or categories.

¹⁹ Alexandra Elisabeth Pfeiffer, *Hedwig Conrad-Martius: eine phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005): 49-90. For a thorough account of the Göttingen and the München phenomenologists’ ontological concerns and their complex relation to Husserl’s project of an “eidetic reduction”: Angela Ales Bello, “Ontology and Phenomenology”, in: *Theory and Application of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives*, eds. Roberto Poli, Johanna Seibt (Heidelberg/Dordrecht/London/New York: Springer, 2010): 289-300.

²⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968): 113. This issue is discussed by Jean-François Lavigne in *Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie (1900-1913)* (Paris: Vrin, 2004) and Angela Ales Bello, “The controversy about the existence of the world in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological school: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein”, *Analecta Husserliana* 79 (2004): 97-116.

²¹ Roman Ingarden, “Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl”, in: Edmund Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, p. 112. For an account of the Ingarden-Husserl controversy: Leo Bostar, “Reading Ingarden read Husserl: Metaphysics, ontology, and phenomenological method”, *Husserl Studies* 10 (1994): 211-36; Robert Sokolowski, “Review of Roman’s Ingarden, *On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*”, *The Journal of Philosophy* 74, no 3 (1977): 176-80.

²² See Amie Thomasson, “Roman Ingarden”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ingarden>, 2. Thus, there are arguments for Ingarden’s commitment to a Brentanian more than strictly Husserlian view of intentionality. For the historical context of the Ingarden-Brentano affinities: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, *Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999): 81-92; Dariusz Lukasiewicz, “Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition”, in: *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy. Kazimierz Twardowski’s Philosophical Legacy*, eds. S. Lapointe et al., *Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science*-vol. 16, (Heidelberg/Dordrecht/London/New York: Springer, 2009): 28-31.

²³ As this is a complex philosophical argumentation which refers back to many of Husserl’s ideals, we won’t get into this here. See the thorough analysis of P. Limido-Heulot: “Phénoménologie et ontologie chez Roman Ingarden”, in: Roman Ingarden, *Husserl. La controverse Idéalisme-Réalisme* (Paris: Vrin, 2001): 9-145.

²⁴ *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, vol. 1, *Logical Investigation II: The ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction* (London: Routledge, 2001/1970). On the role and significance of the *Logical Investigations* in the formation of a phenomenologically driven ontology, away from any metaphysical implications: Angela Ales Bello, “Ontology and Phenomenology”, 289-92. Bello focuses on the significant distinction found in the *Logical Investigations* between the empirically real (*real*) and the essentially or eidetically real (*reell*), which could lead to either a realist or to a transcendental path. Most members of the München phenomenological group, of which Ingarden was a member followed the realist path and abandoned Husserl after his transcendental turn.

²⁵ Gilbert Ryle, “*Essentielle Fragen: Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Wesens*”, *Mind* 36 (1927): 366-70.

²⁶ We won’t get here into the details of his intriguing analysis. See for more: Danuta Gierulanka, “Ingarden’s Philosophical Work. A Systematic Outline”, in: *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden. Interpretations and Assessments*, eds. B. Dziemidok and P. McCormick (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1989): 1-20.

²⁷ Roman Ingarden, *Husserl. La controverse Idéalisme-Réalisme*, 42.

²⁸ *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology* (Independence Ohio: Ridgeview, 1960): 4-6.

²⁹ “The Basic Ontological Categories”, *Language, Truth, and Ontology*, ed. K. Mulligan (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1992): 12-3. Contrary to what Ingarden claims in the *Controversy* book, for Chisholm, both “beginnings” and “processes” are “events” (7). Later on, Chisholm refers once more to Ingarden’s events-processes distinction and introduces “mereological essentialism” with regard to Brentano’s analysis of individuals in space and time (“Ontological Dependent Entities”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, no. 3 (1994): 503, 506-7).

³⁰ We won’t get into a further analysis of the extensive (over 1840 pages) analysis of *Der Streit*, as they will drift us away from the purpose of this paper. It is nevertheless useful to have in mind that, for Ingarden, right from the start “regional” ontologies, such as that of the musical work of art, should definitely lead to a general ontological analysis of the modes of being.

³¹ Roman Ingarden, “Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining its Range”, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 33, no. 3 (1975): 257-69.

³² In his 1961 paper on “A Marginal Commentary to Aristotle’s *Poetics*”, Ingarden argues that, though Aristotle did not theorize the mode of existence of the literary work, or a work of art in general, which would be the outcome of Husserl’s attack on psychologism, he does not defend a psychological theory of art: “his procedure, however, shows that he excludes almost inadvertently and even somewhat naively, the literary work from the sphere of everything psychical” (*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 20, no. 2, 1961, p. 172). In the second part of the paper, Ingarden goes on to find analogies between Aristotle’s account of tragedy and his own analysis of the multi-stratified work of art (162), whereas in the second part of the paper he elaborates the difference between scientific and artistic works in Aristotle (“A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle’s *Poetics*, Part II”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 20, no. 3 (1962): 273-85).

³³ Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetik. Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst*, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Leopold Voss, 1903, 1906).

³⁴ Ernst Kurth, *Die Voraussetzungen der theoretischen Harmonik und der tonalen Darstellungssysteme* (München: E. Katzbichler, 1913); Géza Révész, *Die Formen des Tastsinnes* (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1929); *Einführung in die Musikpsychologie* (Berne: A Francke, 1946). See in this respect: Elisabeth West Marvin, “Tonpsychologie und Musikpsychologie: Historical Perspective of Music Perception”, *Theoria* 2 (1987): 59-84; Leo Rothfarb, “Ernst Kurth’s *Die Voraussetzungen der theoretischen Harmonik* and the Beginnings of Music Psychology”, *Theoria* 4 (1989): 10-33.

³⁵ Waldemar Conrad, “Der ästhetische Gegenstand. Eine phänomenologische Studie”, *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 3 (1908): 71-118, 469-51. Conrad makes special allusion to types of musical artworks, such as symphonies (80). See also his “Die wissenschaftliche und die ästhetische Geisteserhaltung und die Rolle der Fiktion und Illusion in derselben”, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 158 (1915): 129-67; 1916, p. 1-61.

³⁶ Waldemar Conrad, “Der ästhetische Gegenstand. Eine phänomenologische Studie”, 80.

³⁷ *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, vol. 2, Logical Investigation V: *On intentional experiences and their contents* (London: Routledge, 2001/1970), esp. chapter II, §§ 9-21.

³⁸ *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931). Ingarden speaks of «kinship» (*Verwandschaft*) or of «reconstruction mean» (*Rekonstruktionsmittel*) between different artistic fields: Gabriel Pareyson, «Roman Ingarden’s Objectivity vs. Subjectivity as a Problem of Translatability», paper presented at the Symposium on the Interrelationships of Arts : Gesture, Genre, and Gender, Finland, 6/11-15/2010, <http://hdl.handle.net/10138/24790>, 5 p.

³⁹ Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art. Investigations on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 117.

⁴⁰ Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, LXXV. See also Ingarden’s 1929 review of Husserl’s text, where he speaks of Husserl’s idealism as a form of “spiritualist monadology”, for which “die reale Welt wie auch die Welt der kulturellen Gebilde und Werte auf dem Wege einer in wechselseitiger Verstaendigung der Egos sich vollziehenden, intersubjektiven Konstitution “geschaffen” wird und somit auf die *jeweilige* Entwicklungsphase der Ego relativ ist” (“Rezension von: Edmund Husserl, *Formale und Transzendente Logik* (1929)” [*Kant-Studien* 38 (1933)], in: *Husserl*, ed. H. Noack (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973, 170, author’s emphasis). For a discussion of those points: George Kalinowski, “Ontologie et esthétique chez Roman Ingarden”, *Archives de Philosophie* 31 (1968): 283-84; Peter McCormick, “On Ingarden’s Account of the Existence of Aesthetic Objects”, *Dialectics and Humanism* 4 (1975): 35-6.

⁴¹ Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, 118-9. The ontological dependence-thesis is one of Roman Ingarden’s much debated topics in contemporary metaphysics. See indicatively: Peter Simons,

“Ingarden and the Ontology of Dependence”, in: *Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*, ed. Arkadiusz Chrudzinski, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005, 39-53.

⁴² Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, trans. Adam Czerniawski, ed. Jean G. Harrell (London: Macmillan Press, 1986), 61.

⁴³ Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, 55.

⁴⁴ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film*, trans. Raymond Meyer, John T. Goldthwait (Athens Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1989), 43.

⁴⁵ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 91.

⁴⁶ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 120-1.

⁴⁷ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 36. In his later *Controversy over the Existence of the World* Ingarden makes of the purely intentional mode one of the four modes of being (absolute – real – ideal – purely intentional), which refers to entities which are not atemporal (absolute), timeless (ideal) or spatio-temporal (real), but whose existence depends upon acts of consciousness.

⁴⁸ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 44.

⁴⁹ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 32.

⁵⁰ Ingarden makes explicit that the “tones” he refers to are not *hic* and *nunc* acoustic phenomena, which as such do not belong to the structure of the musical work (Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 125).

⁵¹ Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, 64.

⁵² Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, p. 40. Cf. p. 37, 39. See Ingarden’s exchange with his student, the Polish musicologist Zofia Lissa on musical time: Zofia Lissa, “The Temporal Nature of a Musical Work”, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 26, no. 4 (1968): 529-38 and “Aesthetic Functions of Silence and Rests in Music”, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 22, no. 4 (1964): 443-54.

⁵³ “The individual performance begins to be transparent and to disclose to us the work itself, in so far, of course as they themselves are “faithful” to the work.” (Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, 44).

⁵⁴ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 57-8.

⁵⁵ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 95.

⁵⁶ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 59-60.

⁵⁷ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 11; see also 123, n. 123. Here Ingarden reiterates a distinction analyzed in *Der Streit* between individual processes (*Vorgänge*) – a performance would be of this kind –, events (*Ereignisse*), the coming into being of a state of affairs, and objects persisting in time. For the latter, Ingarden proposes, strangely enough, a human being along with a literary artwork.

⁵⁸ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 99-101.

⁵⁹ In his *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, Ingarden proposes a classification of the four modes of being within an “existential-ontological analysis” as opposed both to a “formal-ontological” and to a “material-ontological analysis” (Jeff Mitcherling, *Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics* (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1997), 84-8). Entities may exist absolutely (and be absolute entities), extratemporally or ideally (and be ideal entities), temporally or really (and be real entities) and purely intentionally (*Time and Modes of Being [Der Streit*, vol. I] (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1964), 159-61). Still, the starting point remains the status of the “purely intentional” versus the “real”: this is the bottomline of Ingarden’s harsh critique of *Ideen I*, where Husserl states that the spatio-temporal (the “real”) world has a “merely intentional being”. Daniel von Wachter argues: “Ingarden produces an ontology of the various kinds of things in order to be able to answer the question whether, as Husserl assumes, the world in mind-dependent like fictional objects, or whether only some things in the world are mind-dependent, as Ingarden believes. This is the blot of the *Streit*” (“Roman Ingarden’s Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas, and Other Things Empiricists Do Not Like”, in: *Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*, 55 -7).

⁶⁰ Ingarden refers to a discussion with Husserl, where the latter admits that the story of time is a crazy one (“*eine tolle Geschichte*”), because there lies a vicious circle: the originary time-constituting living experiences (*Erlebnisse*) are themselves *in time*. This is for Ingarden what made Husserl go back to the question of time in 1917-1918: “In den zahlreichen Diskussionen mit Husserl in Jahre 1916 und im Herbst 1917 ging mein Bestreben darin, wenigstens die Hauptpunkte des Weges der konstitutiven Betrachtung von dem ursprunglichen zeitkonstituierenden Bewusstsein aus bis zu der in der Erfahrung konstituierten realen Welt zu verstehen... Ich bin ueberzeugt, dass damals bei Husserl die mannigfachen Zeitprobleme auf neue lebendig wurden und und dass dies zuletzt zu den neuen

Untersuchungen ueber die Zeit in Bernau gefuhrt hat, ohne ihn naturlich sachlich darin irgendwie zu beeinflussen” (“Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl”, 122-23).

⁶¹ A careful study of the 1921 doctoral thesis would give us a clear idea of the intersections between Ingarden’s analysis and Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of time, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁶² Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1991), § 7, 24. Cf. John B. Brough, William Blattner, “Temporality”, in: Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall, *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 128-9.

⁶³ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, § 3, 11.

⁶⁴ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, § 10, 31. On the temporal “flow” as against the individual time-point: § 31, 66 ff. Here again it is the tone formations that serve as the example for illustrating the phenomenon of the now “sinking into the past”.

⁶⁵ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, §§ 12-13 and 14, 19 respectively.

⁶⁶ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, § 16, 40.

⁶⁷ We distinguish three periods in Husserl’s work on the phenomenology of time in three distinct periods: 1905-1916, 1917-1928, 1929-1935: Natalie Depraz, “Temporalité et affection dans les manuscrits tardifs sur la temporalité (1929-1935) de Husserl”, *Alter 2* (1994): 82-6.

⁶⁸ This is the case in the so called Bernau-manuscripts, where Husserl’s initial insights into the phenomenology of time are put under further scrutiny (Nicholas de Warren, *Husserl and the Promise of Time* (Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 180-1). These modifications affect the way in which the constitutive moments of transcendental temporality, such as retention, are considered. Nicholas de Warren remarks: “A change in Husserl’s terminology announces this renewed concern with describing how retentional modification is responsible for a contraction of perspective, an opening of distance, a loss of intuitive fullness, a diminishing of affectivity, and the creation of depth within consciousness in becoming its own past. Husserl replaces his earlier use of the terms ‘run-off’ (*Ablauf*) and ‘running-off’ (*Ablaufen*) with the newly promoted term *Abklang* – “subside”, “decay”, “fading” – arguably because “subsiding” (*Abklang*) evokes more sharply the aural experience of hearing the decay of a note” (184).

⁶⁹ Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926*, *Husserliana XI* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). For a comprehensive approach to Husserl’s later understanding of temporality: Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

⁷⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution. Die D-Manuskripte (1929-1934)* (Dordrecht/Boston: Springer, 2006).

⁷¹ At this point we follow Natalie Depraz’s insightful suggestions: “lorsqu’un son – exemple recurrent élu par Husserl – commence, dure puis finit, la forme même de sa temporalité pour moi, impression originaire retentionnalisée puis éventuellement reproduite au sein d’un souvenir secondaire, se voit dotée d’une teneur affective spécifique: le son m’affecte différemment à chaque instant de son impression puis de sa retention en moi...” (“Temporalité et affection dans les manuscrits tardifs sur la temporalité (1929-1935) de Husserl”, 77-8). Cf. Anne Montavont, “Le phenomene de l’affection dans les *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*”, *Alter 2* (1994): 119-39. On the concept of “affective power” in the *Analysen*: 130-1.

⁷² See Husserl’s discussion of retention and protention under this new light: *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution*, Manuskript C 13, Nr. 62, 264-72. Also his discussion of “Phantasie-Ich” against the “wirkliches Ich”: Nr. 64, 275-79. Cf. Lanei Rodemeyer, *Intersubjective Temporality*, *Phenomenologica* 176 (Dordrecht/Boston: Springer, 2006), 92-104; Laszlo Tengelyi, “Impression originaire et remplissements des protentions chez Husserl”, in: *La conscience du temps. Autour des Leçons sur le temps de Husserl*, ed. Jocelyn Benoist (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 35-44.

⁷³ For Dan Zahavi, Husserl distinguishes between three layers of temporality – the objective time of the appearing objects, the immanent, subjective time of the intentional acts, and the absolute, pre-phenomenal, pre-reflexive flow of time-constituting consciousness. Nevertheless: “In the *Bernau Manuskripte ueber das Zeitbewusstsein*...Husserl argued that one should distinguish between the perception of a tone, on the one hand, and the original or inner consciousness in which the perception is constituted as a temporality unity on the other...” (“Inner (Time-)Consciousness”, in: *On Time. New*

Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, eds. D. Lohmar, I. Yamaguchi, *Phaenomenologica* 197 (Dordrecht/Boston: Springer 2010), 328).

⁷⁴ Eugene Montague, "Phenomenology and the Hard Problem of Consciousness and Music", in: *Music and Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. D. Clarke, E. Clarke, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29-33. Moreover, Husserl's later analyses of phenomenological time could give an answer to those critiques who argue that his analysis cannot serve as a model for a phenomenology of music, because by using melody as a paradigmatic temporal object it restricts itself to a serial model of musical temporality: Shaun Gallagher, *The Inordinance of Time* (Evanston IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 97.

⁷⁵ Ingarden refers to a discussion with Husserl, where the latter admits that the story of time is a crazy one ("eine tolle Geschichte"), because there lies a vicious circle: the originary time-constituting living experiences (Erlebnisse) are themselves *in time*. This is for Ingarden what made Husserl go back to the question of time in 1917/18 ("Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl", 122-3).

⁷⁶ Roman Ingarden, "Meine Erinnerungen an Edmund Husserl", 121-2.

⁷⁷ Klaus Held, "Phenomenology of Authentic Time", in: *On Time. New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*, eds. D. Lohmar, I. Yamaguchi, *Phaenomenologica* 197 (Dordrecht: Springer 2010), 92. Held also speaks of the "happening of the field of presence" or time in Husserl as a happening, in contrast to time as a still form, a series of points in time or "nows" (p. 93). In similar terms, Sean Kelly draws the line between those theories of time he designates as "the Specious Present" theories and those which are taken to be "Retention Theories". The phenomenology of time, e.g. in Husserl, belongs to the second kind of theories, because it claims that along with the sensible qualities of an object extended in time, we also perceive its temporal extent: you hear more than the note of a soprano in the opera house, because you experience the note as having gone on for a long time, that is you experience time ("The Puzzle of Temporal Experience", in: *Cognition and the Brain. The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement*, eds. Andrew Brook, Kathleen Atkins (Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 208-39. In other words, the note not only *has* the form of time, but *is* in the form of time.

⁷⁸ Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, 24-5. "What Husserl attempts to explain with the concept of melody is rather a musical line or a unit defined as a figure. In music, a melodic line has certain kinds of motives (units), phrases and periods. In this sense, melody does not seem to be appropriate for his discussion. "Melodic phrases" seem more relevant to his discussion instead of melody or motives" (Kivilcim Y. Senurkmez, "Time, Memory, and the Musical Perception", *Analecta Husserliana*, ed. A.-T. Tymieniecka, *CI* (2009): 159).

⁷⁹ On the tripartite constitution of time-consciousness and its schematic presentation: John B. Bough, "Translator's Introduction", in: Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, XXXVIII-XLV.

⁸⁰ Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and Its Identity*, 127.

⁸¹ Roman Ingarden, *Cognition of the literary Work of Art*, 123.

⁸² Roman Ingarden, *Cognition of the literary Work of Art*, 139. Ingarden mentions here once more Edmund Husserl's *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* as well as his *Ideen I*, §§ 81-82, various writings by H. Bergson and H. Conrad-Martius' study *Die Zeit* (Münich: Kösel Verlag, 1958): 105.

⁸³ Roman Ingarden, *Cognition of the literary Work of Art*, 134.

⁸⁴ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 70.

⁸⁵ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 30.

⁸⁶ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 63-4. In his treatment of emotional qualities he refers to Max Scheler's phenomenological account of the tragical (67).

⁸⁷ Roman Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, 93.

⁸⁸ Anita Azczepańska, "The Structure of Artworks", in: *On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden. Interpretations and Assessments*, eds. B. Dziemidok – P. McCormick (The Hague: Kluwer, 1989), 33.

⁸⁹ On the significant demarcation between 'structure in time' and "temporal structure": Joan Stambaugh, "Music as a Temporal Form", *The Journal of Philosophy* LXI (1964): 266-68.

⁹⁰ "Music need not be understood just in terms of what is described by theories of music, because it can itself help to constitute new kinds of thinking. The emergence of the notion of a "musical idea" from Kant's notion of "aesthetic idea" in Romantic thought indicates how the notion of thought as inherently propositional and representational fails to come to terms with some of the kinds of intelligibility involved in the practices of music (*Music, Philosophy, and Modernity* (Cambridge Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76.

⁹¹ Julian Dodd, "Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology", *Philosophy Compass* 3, no. 6 (2008): 1114.

⁹² Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity*, 57. Cf. Amie Thomasson, "Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?", *Philosophy Compass* 1, no. 3 (2006), 245-55. Thomasson argues that we should go beyond both platonistic abstracta and created artifacts existing solely through compositional acts, but this of course demands the elaboration of a system of more refined and broader ontological categories.

⁹³ Peter Kivy, "Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defense", *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 19 (1983): 109-29; "Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defense", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1983): 245-52; Julian Dodd, "Musical Works as Eternal Types", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 40 (2000): 424-40; "Defending Musical Platonism", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42 (2002), p. 380-402; "Types, Continuants, and the Ontology of Music", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44 (2004): 342-60.

⁹⁴ Jerrold Levinson, "What a Musical Work Is, Again", *Music, Art, and Metaphysics. Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1990), 215-63.

⁹⁵ Stephen Davies, "Ontologies of Musical Works", *Themes in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31-46.

⁹⁶ Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson, "Defending Musical Perdurantism", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 48/1 (2008), p. 380-402; Stefano Predelli, "Against Musical Platonism", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 35 (1995), p. 338-350; G. Rohrbaugh, "Artworks as Historical Individuals", *European Journal of Philosophy* 11 (2003): 177-205.

⁹⁷ In this respect: Amie Thomasson, "Ingarden and the Theory of Dependence", *ΣΟΦΙΑ* 3 (2003) (in Polish).

⁹⁸ Roman Ingarden, "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects", in: *Existence, Culture, and Persons: The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*, 115-36. See also Thomasson's "The Ontology of Art" in: Peter Kivy (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 78-92.

⁹⁹ Amie Thomasson, "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects", 131-32.