

Music in Aristotle *Politics* Book VIII
Introduction and chapters 1–3 (1337a–1338b7): PART 2

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Introduction

Yesterday we closed our morning section by announcing that the answer to the third question raised by Aristotle at the end of Book 7 («of what particular nature the public supervision on education ought to be») would be at issue from chapter 2 onwards. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of that chapter, after a brief rewording of the answers which had already been given to the first two questions (regarding the need for legislation on education and insisting on its public character), Aristotle sets the agenda of his next topic:

It is clear, then, that there should be legislation about education and that it should be conducted on a public system. But consideration must be given to the question, what constitutes education and what is the proper way to be educated (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337a 33 ff.)¹.

The topic on the nature of education is openly split into two: first it is necessary to consider what exactly should we intend for ‘education’ (τίς δ’ ἔσται ἡ παιδεία); then the manner to carrying it out (καὶ πῶς γρη̄ παιδεύεσθαι). On both questions —Aristotle adds— there are differences of opinions.

As regards the content of *paideia*, people disagree about what should be taught, either **with respect to virtue** or **to best life**: «not everyone agrees as to the things that the young ought to learn, either with a view to virtue (πρὸς ἀρετήν), or with a view to the best life (πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον)» (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337a 36 ff.). Let’s remember that, for Aristotle, the best life is a ‘social’ life, that is, a life in which the citizen may apply his practical wisdom, called *phronēsis*, to the common good of the community. [On the usage by Aristotle in these last two books of the *Politics* of his previously elaborated ideas on the best life, see his remarks in *Pol.* 7.1, 1323a 21 ff.: «believing therefore in

¹ Ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον, φανερόν· τίς δ’ ἔσται ἡ παιδεία καὶ πῶς γρη̄ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.

the adequacy of much of what is said even in extraneous discourses on the subject of the best life (περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς), let us make use of these pronouncements now»²].

As regards the manner, instead, he says that we need to discuss whether musical education is better suited to the improvement of **intelligence** or to that of **the character of the soul** (*Pol.* 7.17, 1337a 38 f.: πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος). It is interesting here to notice that, differently from Plato, Aristotelian education influences no longer the *psychē* as a whole, but just a part of it, which, though being irrational by nature, nevertheless takes reason into account³. For Aristotle's definition of *ēthos*, see the *Eudemian Ethics* 2.2, 1220b 5 f.: «consider, then, character (ἦθος) to be a quality in accordance with governing reason belonging to the irrational part of the soul, which is yet able to obey the reason»⁴.

The first question (the content of *paideia*) is discussed at length and answered in the rest of this chapter and the next. An answer to the second question (as to which is the best way through which education may be instilled) will be implicitly given too, since the conclusion reached in chapter 3 evidently involves such an issue. But different opinions concerning the ways in which education works depend also on what virtue we need to achieve (since there are intellectual as well as moral virtues, as we will see):

For, to start with, all men do not honour the same virtue, so that they naturally hold different opinions in regard to training in virtue (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337b 2 f.)⁵.

But let's proceed in order.

The content of education in Aristotle's ideal city

The inquiry on what should we teach pupils is more specifically addressed in the following sentence. It is not at all clear —Aristotle says— whether the pupils should practise pursuits that are useful for life (τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον), or virtuous (τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν), or extraordinary (τὰ περιττά):

² νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

³ F. Woerther, *Music and the education of the soul in Plato and Aristotle: homoeopathy and the formation of character*, «CQ» 58 (2008), pp. 89–103.

⁴ διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τοῦ ἀλόγου μέν>, δυναμένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.

⁵ καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτῆς.

And confusing questions arise out of the education that actually prevails, and it is not at all clear whether the pupils should practise pursuits that are practically useful, or morally edifying, or higher accomplishments—for all these views have won the support of some judges (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337a 39 ff.)⁶.

This tripartition is echoed by some Aristotelian remarks, more specifically related to music, that we may find further in the text. In chapter 5, in fact, we are told that, according to Aristotle, the possible ends of music are the following three:

- amusement (*παιδιά*), which is «for the sake of relaxation (*ἀνάπαυσις*), and relaxation must necessarily be pleasant, for it is a way of curing the pain due to laborious work» (*Pol.* 8.4, 1339b 15 ff.)⁷. This end is strictly connected to manual labour, hence it is proper to the laboring class of society, the *banausoi*, who provide necessities for the citizens and, as a consequence, need to take a rest from their work: «for a man who is at work needs rest, and rest is the object of play, while business is accompanied by toil and exertion» (*Pol.* 8.3, 1337b 38 ff.)⁸. Thus for these people music can be considered useful for life.
- education (*παιδεία*), because music, for Aristotle, allows the *ēthos* to acquire the virtue that is proper to it (i.e., the *aretē ēthikē*): «and since it is the case that music is one of the things that give pleasure, and that virtue has to do with feeling delight and love and hatred rightly, there is obviously nothing that it is more needful to learn (*μανθάνειν*) and become habituated to (*συνεθίζεσθαι*) than to judge correctly (*τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς*) and to delight in virtuous characters and noble actions» (*Pol.* 8.5, 1340a 14 ff.)⁹. Music, then, may contribute to make citizens more virtuous: we will see how this second goal of music is strictly linked with the next one.
- intellectual enjoyment (*διαγωγή*), which is proper of those citizens who, being free (*eleutheroi*) and having the leisure (*scholē*) to devote themselves to cultural

⁶ ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμ ποδῶν παιδείας παραχώδης ἢ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πό τερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τεινοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτὰς τις).

⁷ ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἠδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρία τις ἐστίν),

⁸ ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας).

⁹ ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἠδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μὴθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπικέρειν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν.

pursuits, may achieve practical virtues and, consequently, take part in political life and serve the common interests of the community. Let's remember that, for Aristotle, any kind of manual labour completely disqualifies someone from substantive political participation, and that the essence of citizenship lies in such a participation. In chapter 3, indeed, the philosopher says that «there are certain things one must learn (τὰ παιδεύματα) and be trained in (τὰς μαθήσεις) with a view to the conduct of leisure (πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν), and that these objects of training and instruction exist for their own sake, while the things in which one is trained and instructed with a view to the work (πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν) are there a matter of necessity (ἀναγκαίως) and to serve other ends» (*Pol.* 8.3, 1338 a 9 ff.)¹⁰.

Therefore, it seems likely that *ta peritta* (i.e. the extraordinary things) refer to activities typical of noble leisure, which exist for their own sake, and that music may be included among them. Again, in chapter 3, we are told that «people in earlier times prescribed music as part of education not as being a necessity (οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον), since it is no such thing, nor as being practically useful (οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον), in the way that writing is useful in business, in the management of the household, in learning, and in many affairs of the state [...] only the conduct of our leisure (τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν) is left; and they themselves make it plain that it was for this purpose that they introduced it, since they included it — that is, the music— in the way of life that they thought proper to free men (τῶν ἐλευθέρων)» (*Pol.* 8.3, 1338 a 13 ff.).

From what has been said up to now, it follows that the three ends of music (which may be interpreted as realizing the three categories of educational contents, that are: useful, virtuous and extraordinary things) are not mutually exclusive from each other, but depend on the social class to which a particular kind of music is addressed.

Indeed, if we proceed in the reading of the text, we realize that, very soon in chapter 2, Aristotle replaces this division into three items by another division, that of liberal (τῶν τε ἐλευθερίων ἔργων) and illiberal (τῶν ἀνελευθερίων):

¹⁰ ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μαθάνειν ἅπτα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύτας τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίως καὶ χάριν ἄλλων.

It is therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught those useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal, and that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will not render the person who participates in them vulgar (βάνουσον) (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337b 4 ff.)¹¹.

On the basis of the distinction between activities that are free (that is, befitting a free man) and activities that are unfree (that is, befitting a non-free man), Aristotle denies that the free young should learn anything, whether useful or necessary, that is vulgarly mechanical (*banauson*), since such a thing would render their bodies¹² (as well as their souls and minds)¹³ useless for the deeds of virtue:

A task and also an art or a science must be deemed vulgar (βάνουσον) if it renders the body or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue. Hence we entitle vulgar (βαναύσουσ) all such arts as deteriorate the condition of the body, and also the industries that earn wages; for they make the mind preoccupied and degraded (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337b 9 ff.)¹⁴.

Hence virtue may be developed only within leisure (*scholē*): «to seek for utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to men that are great-souled (μεγαλοψύχοις) and free (ἐλευθερίοις)» (*Pol.* 8.3, 1338b 2 f.)¹⁵.

It seems evident, then, that the most important contents of education should be neither necessary nor useful, but ‘liberal’, and that music is a perfect example of such a liberal

¹¹ ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθερίων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθερίων φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάνουσον.

¹² Cf. *Pol.* 1.11, 1258b 35–39: «The most scientific of these industries are those which involve the smallest element of chance, the most mechanic those in which the operatives undergo the greatest amount of bodily degradation, the most servile those in which the most uses are made of the body, and the most ignoble those in which there is the least requirement of virtue as an accessory» (εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώτατα μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ’ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς).

¹³ Cf. *Pol.* 7.8, 1328b 39 ff.: «the citizens must not live a mechanic or a mercantile life (for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue), nor yet must those who are to be citizens in the best state be tillers of the soil (for leisure is needed both for the development of virtue and for active participation in politics)» (οὔτε βάνουσον βίον οὔτ’ ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννῆς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς).

¹⁴ βάνουσον δ’ ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσουσ καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινὴν.

¹⁵ τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρησίμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις.

activity: «It is clear therefore that there is a form of education in which boys should be trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble (ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν)» (*Pol.* 8.3, 1338a 31 ff.)¹⁶. This is the reason why «people in earlier times prescribed music as part of education» (διὸ καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν)¹⁷, being it useful «for the conduct of our leisure» (πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν)¹⁸.

In Aristotle's ideal state, the most important fulfillment of music education is therefore circumscribed to free men, according to the ancient aristocratic model (see the Homeric examples from the *Odyssey* quoted in Book 8, chapter 3, 1338a 24 ff., where music is described in its place at the relaxation of a banquet). Through learning and habituation —the two ways by means of which, we will see, it is possible to be trained— free men may develop their virtues and, once they have become virtuous, they are able to serve the common interests of the *polis*.

In this respect, Aristotle's adherence to the aristocratic ideology of the classical period is clearly expressed. But, though dismissing lower class workers as vulgar, nevertheless the philosopher takes into account the need for their presence in the state (even if he does not recognize them as citizens)¹⁹, and he consequently admits the necessity to have specific forms of melodies useful for them too, so that they may enjoy the third benefit that music is able to furnish: the «amusement for the sake of relaxation and relief from tension» (*Pol.* 8.7, 1341b 40 f.: τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν πρὸς ἄνεσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν).

The Aristotelian classification of the three goals of music (or even four, if we add *catharsis*, as the author will do in chapter 6) is, hence, strictly linked to the socio-political picture the author gives of the *polis*. This *polis*, far from being 'ideal' in a Platonic sense, refers to a community which may be identified with (or which closely resembles) the democratic Athens of the Classical period. As other scholars have

¹⁶ ἦν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμη παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστιν.

¹⁷ *Pol.* 8.3, 1338a 13 ff.

¹⁸ *Pol.* 8.3, 1338a 22.

¹⁹ The exclusion of all non-leisured individuals from real, meaningful citizenship is a point on which both Aristotle and the Plato of the *Republic* absolutely agree (cf. T.. Samaras, *Aristotle's Politics: the city of book seven and the question of ideology*, «CQ» 57 (2007), pp. 77–89).

already pointed out²⁰, in Book 8 Aristotle seems to consciously allude to the language of Pericles' famous *Funeral Oration* reported by Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* (2.35 ff.). This speech, probably delivered by the statesman Pericles at the end of the first year of the war, turns out to be a glorification of Athens' achievements by the famous popular leader. In such a talk, the insistence on the social relevance of the civic festivities (*heortai*) and the rest (*anapausis*) that working people need from everyday toil well reflects the growing importance of socio-cultural phenomena which were deeply rooted in late fifth (and, then, fourth) century Athens: a higher and higher level of artistic professionalism and an increasing pursuit of the spectacular in music contests and performances, all elements dominated by the audience's expectations (a phenomenon called by Plato 'theatrocracy')²¹.

And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; our homes are beautiful and elegant; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own (Thuc. *Hist.* 2.38.1)²².

It appears evident, then, how much the last two books of the *Politics* are embedded within Aristotelian political thought, in turn influenced to a great extent by the social and political events occurring during the Classical period. Just at the beginning of Book 8 of the *Politics*, in fact, Aristotle had claimed that, though education has to be opportunely inspired by fundamental principles (since it aims at providing a guarantee

²⁰ D. Musti, *La funzione della musica nel libro VIII della Politica di Aristotele*, in D. Restani (cur.), *Etnomusicologia storica del mondo antico*, Ravenna 2006, pp. 43–61.

²¹ Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 8.6, 1341a 9 ff.: «And this would come about in respect of their study if the pupils did not go on toiling at the exercises that aim at professional competitions, nor the wonderful and elaborate performances which have now entered into the competitions and have passed from the competitions into education, but also only practised exercises not of that sort until they are able to enjoy beautiful tunes and rhythms, and not merely the charm common to all music, which even some lower animals enjoy, as well as a multitude of slaves and children» (συμβαίνοι δ' ἂν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοῖεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀγῶνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνια ζῶων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων).

²² Καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνῶμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μὲν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίαις νομίζοντες, ἰδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπέσιν, ὧν καθ' ἡμέραν ἢ τέρνευς τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει. ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειότερα τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦ σθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.

for the stability of the state), it has to adapt to the existing kind of constitution: it has to be ‘democratic’ in a democratic state, ‘aristocratic’ in an aristocratic state, and so on:

education ought to be adapted to the particular form of constitution, since the particular character belonging to each constitution both guards the constitution generally and originally establishes it—for instance the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy; and the best spirit always causes a better constitution (*Pol.* 8.1, 1337a 14 ff.)²³.

If Aristotle ever wrote a more technical treatise on music (the *Peri mousikēs* mentioned by Diogenes Laertius), this cannot—I believe—be identified with the last book of the *Politics*, whose contents are, as I hope I have demonstrated, strictly ‘political’.

The manner of education in Aristotle’s ideal city: training and instruction

The next important issue discussed by Aristotle in order to complete his general picture of education is related to the ‘way’ in which education works to instil virtues in the citizens: «consideration must be given to the question [...] what is the proper way to be educated (πῶς χρῆ παιδεύεσθαι)» (*Pol.* 8.2, 1337a 34 f.).

As I have said yesterday, in Book 7 Aristotle had already described the ways through which a citizen may become virtuous: «there are admittedly three things by which men are made good and virtuous (ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι), and these three things are nature (φύσις), habit (ἔθος) and reason (λόγος)» (*Pol.* 7.13, 1332a 38 ff.). Nature is inborn, and is also a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for virtue: hence education need to perfect what is only potentially provided by nature, and can do it both through habits and through reason.

On the basis that it will be the same education (παιδεία) and habits (ἔθη) that make a man good and capable as a citizen (since the virtue of a man and that of a citizen in the best state must of necessity be the same)²⁴, Aristotle wishes now to resolve the question whether habits or reason are more to be aimed at, in the process of instilling virtues, and in which order these two devices must be employed by educators: «it remains to

²³ τὸ γὰρ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας.

²⁴ *Pol.* 3.18, 1288a 37 ff.: ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης [...] ὥστ’ ἔσται καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταῦτά σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν.

consider whether men ought to be educated first by means of the reason or by the habits/τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν» (*Pol.* 7.15, 1334b 8 f.)²⁵.

Habituation should necessarily come into play during this learning process, as is clearly stated by the philosopher also in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here the notion of ἔθος is identified as the condition through which a man may acquire ethical virtue:

Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul. Some forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues (τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς), others moral virtues (τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς): wisdom (σοφίαν) or intelligence (σύνεσιν) and prudence (φρόνησιν) are intellectual, liberality (ἐλευθεριότητα) and temperance (σωφροσύνην) are moral virtues. [...] Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction (ἐκ διδασκαλίας), and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit (ἐξ ἔθους), and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word [...] The virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit (τελειούμενοις διὰ τοῦ ἔθους) (*Eth. Nic.* 1.13, 1103a 3 ff.)²⁶.

On Aristotle's view, education is for the sake of developing virtues, both moral and intellectual. Habituation is the principal mode of education for moral virtues, while instruction is the mode for intellectual virtues, even if the two are bound up together (*Pol.* 7.15, 1134b 9 ff.: «for between reason and habit the most perfect harmony ought to exist, as it is possible both for the reason to have missed the highest principle and for men to have been as wrongly trained through the habits»)²⁷.

Very soon at the beginning of Book 8, Aristotle says that «in regard to all the faculties and crafts certain forms of preliminary education (προπαιδεύεσθαι) and training (προεθίζεσθαι) in their various operations are necessary, so that manifestly this is also requisite in regard to the actions of virtue» (*Pol.* 8.1, 1337a.18 ff.)²⁸. After having

²⁵ [...] λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν.

²⁶ διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς· σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. [...] Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. [...] οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειούμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.

²⁷ ταῦτα (sc. reason and habit) γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἴχθαι.

²⁸ ἔτι δὲ πρὸς πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχναις ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. Cf. *Pol.* 7.13, 1332b 8 ff.: «we have

assimilated the ethical virtue thanks to habituation, a virtuous man feels then ‘pleasure’ in acting virtuously:

An index (σημεῖον) of our dispositions is afforded by the pleasure (ἡδονήν) or pain (λύπην) that accompanies our actions. A man is temperate (σώφρων) if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable (αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων), profligate if he feels it irksome; he is brave (ἀνδρείος) if he faces danger with pleasure (χαίρων) or at all events without pain, coward (δειλός) if he does so with pain. In fact pleasures and pains are the things with which moral virtue is concerned. For pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain cause us to abstain from doing noble actions. Hence the importance, as Plato points out, of having been definitely trained from childhood to like (χαίρειν) and dislike (λυπεῖσθαι) the proper things; this is what good education (ὀρθή παιδεία) means (Eth. Nic. 2.2, 1104b 3 f.)²⁹.

This passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* explains the mechanism which underpins the effectiveness of education. It consists in ‘habituating’ young people to experience pleasure in the things that they are not yet capable of judging rationally, and whose value they cannot yet understand on their own:

The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first having actually practised them, just as we do the arts [...] This truth is attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action (οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοῦς,)—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad one (*Eth. Nic. 2.2, 1103a 31 ff.*)³⁰.

As Aristotle clearly states at the end of Book 8, chapter 3 of the *Politics*, the training of habits comes first (by order of precedence, not of importance): «it is plain that education by habit must come before education by reason» (*Pol. 8.3, 1338b 4 ff.*: δὲ φανερόν τὸ πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ παιδευτέον εἶναι).

already defined the proper natural character of those who are to be malleable (εὐχειρώτους) to the hand of the legislator; what now remains is the task of education, for men learn some things by practice, others by precept (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθίζόμενοι μαθάνουσι τὰ δ’ ἀκούοντες)»

²⁹ Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινωσμένην ἡδονήν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ’ ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρείος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονήν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἢ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

³⁰ τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν [...] μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοῦς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

Moreover, as explicitly claimed in the passage of the *Ethics* quoted above, the necessity of training the character from childhood so that he enjoys (χαίρειν) ‘good’ feelings and characters and dislike (λυπεῖσθαι) bad ones is something about which Aristotle agrees with Plato. In Book 2 of his *Laws*, Plato had clearly emphasized the importance of disciplining ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’, the first sensations felt by human beings. In fact, these sensations may act as a vehicle to ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ of the soul:

What I state is this, that in children the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain (ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην), and that it is in these first that goodness and badness (ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία) come to the soul; [...] I term, then, the goodness that first comes to children ‘education’ (παιδεία). When pleasure and love, and pain and hatred, spring up rightly in the souls of those who are unable as yet to grasp a rational account; and when, after grasping the rational account, they consent thereunto through having been rightly trained (ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι) in fitting practices: this consent, viewed as a whole, is goodness (ἀρετή), while the part of it that is rightly trained in respect of pleasures and pains, so as to hate what ought to be hated, right from the beginning up to the very end, and to love what ought to be loved, if you were to mark this part off in your definition and call it ‘education’, you would be giving it, in my opinion, its right name (Plato *Leg.* 653a–c)³¹.

The terminological and conceptual similarities between the two positions are plainly evident: pleasure is the best way to attract children towards virtues, though it cannot be an aim, but only a means. Compare this passage with the Aristotelian remarks at *Pol.* 8.5, 1339b20 ff.:

but we all pronounce music to be one of the pleasantest things, whether instrumental or instrumental and vocal music together [...] But it has come about that men make amusements an end [...] yet the nature of music is more honourable than corresponds with the employment of it mentioned, and it is proper not only to participate in the common pleasure that springs from it, which is perceptible to everybody (for the pleasure contained in music is of a natural kind, owing to which the use of it is dear to those of all ages and character), but to see if its influence reaches also in a manner to the character and to the soul³².

³¹ Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῆ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον [...] παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παραγινομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετὴν· ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνονται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη ‘σθ’ ἢ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετὴ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.

³² τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντας εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψι λὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας [...] συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδίας τέλος [...] τιμιωτέρα δ’ αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν

According to both philosophers, education by habit (having effect on the irrational part of human soul, that is, on what Aristotle calls *ēthos*)³³ must be employed before education by reason³⁴, «because passion (θυμός) and will (βούλησις), and also appetite (ἐπιθυμία), exist in children even as soon as they are born, but it is the nature of reasoning and intelligence (ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς) to arise in them as they grow older» (*Pol.* 7.15, 1334b 22 ff.)³⁵.

Besides that, we may find other correspondences between the two philosophers, especially at a political level. By contrast with the *Republic*, Plato in the *Laws* had restricted the status of ‘citizens’ to those people whose aim was the pursuit and cultivation of the virtues, therefore excluding not only slaves and foreigners, but also the lower classes mentioned in his earlier dialogue, such as the producers and the guardians: exactly the same procedure adopted by Aristotle with the *banausoi* in his *polis*. The previous hierarchical class society had, thus, appeared replaced with a more egalitarian (but more circumscribed) structure, whose stability depended on the cohesion of the civic body, which should have been the subject of a ‘correct’ education (*Leg.* 653a: τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν, cf. *Eth. Nic.* 2.2, 1104b 13: «this is what ὀρθὴ παιδεία means»).

As Prof. Poehlmann will better explain in the following lectures, scholars have repeatedly tried to integrate Book 8 of the *Politics* into the first period of Aristotle in Athens, when he was a pupil of the Platonic Academy, on the basis of terminological and conceptual similarities between them. These first chapters of Book 8 —opportunistically integrated with the ethical theory displayed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*— seem, then, to be fully consistent with this hypothesis.

Let’s now conclude our reading of the first section of Book 8 by considering the more specific information Aristotle gives us on the four subjects of education more common in the *polis*. Finally, we will comment on his remarks concerning music’ goals again.

εἰρημένην χρεῖαν. καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἢ μουσικὴ τιν’ ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἡθεσιν ἢ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλέτης), ἀλλ’ ὀρᾶν εἶπαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.

³³ Arist. *Pol.* 8.2, 1337a 39.

³⁴ Cf. *Pol.* 8.3, 1338b 4 ff.

³⁵ φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προῖοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

The four subjects of education: music and leisure time

During his observations on the contents of education and the forms it takes, Aristotle more explicitly enters into the details of the subjects usually taught in existing educational practice:

The branches of study at present established fall into both classes, as was said before. There are perhaps four customary subjects of education, reading and writing (γράμματα), gymnastics (γυμναστικήν), music (μουσικήν), and fourth, with some people, drawing (γραφικήν); reading and writing and drawing being taught as being useful for the purposes of life and very serviceable, and gymnastics as contributing to manly courage; but as to music, here one might raise a question [...] (*Pol.* 8.3, 1337b 22 ff.)³⁶.

Aristotle explains that some of these subjects (*grammata* and *graphikē*) fall into the category of the useful (τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὕσας καὶ πολυχρήστους). *Gymnastikē* is valued for its contribution to one of the virtues, *andreia* (τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσας πρὸς ἀνδρείαν). But there are uncertainties about music, whose role in education is puzzling, hence most people opt for pleasure as its purpose (τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς). Aristotle, however, counters that music was introduced at the beginning with a view to noble leisure, which turns out to be the end of best life:

[...] as to music, here one might raise a question. For at present most people take part in it for the sake of pleasure; but those, who originally included it in education did so because, as has often been said, nature itself seeks to be able not only to engage rightly in business but also to occupy leisure nobly (σχολάζειν [...] καλῶς); for—to speak about it yet again— this is the first principle of all things. For if although both business and leisure are necessary, yet leisure is more desirable and more fully an end than business, we must inquire what is the proper occupation of leisure (*Pol.* 8.3, 1337b 27 ff.)³⁷.

³⁶ αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημένοι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασιν, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἐνιοὶ γραφικὴν· τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὕσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσας πρὸς ἀνδρείαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις.

³⁷ τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων μία· καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δ' ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἰρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον ὅτι δεῖ ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν.

In Book 7, Aristotle had split life as a whole into business and leisure (ἀσχολία καὶ σχολή), war and peace (πόλεμος καὶ εἰρήνη), and had stated that some of our actions are aimed at things necessary and useful (ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα), others at things noble (καλά)³⁸. For him, leisure and peace are the ends of a good life, and activities which are necessary and useful have to be pursued only for the purpose of noble things. Therefore the statesman has to educate citizens to employ leisure on their best:

it is the duty of the lawgiver rather to study how he may frame his legislation both with regard to warfare and in other departments for the object of leisure (τοῦ σχολάζειν) and of peace (τῆς εἰρήνης). Most military states remain safe while at war but perish when they have won their empire; in peace-time they lose their keen temper, like iron. The lawgiver is to blame, because he did not educate them to be able to employ leisure (*Pol.* 7.14, 1334a 2 ff.)³⁹.

Within the four disciplines mentioned by the philosopher, music is clearly the only one suitable to leisure: «there is a form of education in which boys should be trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble (ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν); though whether there is one such subject of education or several, —Aristotle continues— and what these are and how they are to be pursued, must be discussed later» (*Pol.* 8.3, 1338a 30 ff.)⁴⁰.

The insistence on the need to define leisure's activities and to include music among them has, then, the purpose of orienting and contextualizing the hedonistic side of music within the boundaries of a not-for-profit activity (see, for instance, the concerns we may read at chapter 6 on the inappropriateness, for free citizens, of developing professional musical abilities). Again it seems evident that, for Aristotle, the most important interest is to safeguard the privileges of upper class, the only social class who can afford leisure.

More technical details on musical structures and instruments and on their suitability to different contexts of social Greek life will, of course, be given in the other chapters of Book 8, on which we will hear further comments during the next days of this seminar.

³⁸ *Pol.* 7.14, 1333a 30 ff.: διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ σχολήν καὶ εἰς πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν [εἰς τὰ] ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ [εἰς τὰ] καλά.

³⁹ ὅτι δὲ δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν ἔνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σφύζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀνιᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

⁴⁰ ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστιν· πότερον δὲ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς, ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν.

Before concluding, however, I would like just to add some information on the reception of the Aristotelian treatise, especially as far as its musical section is concerned.

The reception of Politics, Book 8

In opposition to what has happened to other Aristotelian writings, the *Politics* was not a great success in late antiquity: the political model it was offering was too old since, at the end of the fourth century BC, the *polis* had already disappeared. Consequently we have no ancient commentaries on this text and also its manuscript tradition is quite late. In fact, of the approximately thirty manuscripts which are known nowadays, only one may be dated back to the XIV century, while the others are more recent, certainly all subsequent to the first Latin translation of the treatise. It is only, in fact, in the mid-thirteenth century (1260) that William of Moerbeke, a prolific medieval translator of philosophical, medical, and scientific texts from Greek into Latin, completed his Latin translation of this Aristotelian text.

At the beginning of the Renaissance, however, a new attention to political and ethical themes revitalized the humanists' interest in works like the *Politics*, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the pseudo-aristotelian *Economics*, at that moment conceived as useful guides to practical life⁴¹. An influential promoter of this small revolution was the Florentine humanist Leonardo Bruni, who translated these three Aristotelian writings directly from the original Greek texts (1417: *Nicomachean Ethics*; 1420: *Economics*; 1438: *Politics*) and was he himself author of political treatises inspired by the Aristotelian model (1439: *Sulla costituzione dei fiorentini*). In such a period and cultural context, the content of the *Politics* (concerned with the *civitas* and the *res publica*) was perceived as the most useful for the aristocratic citizens since, at that time, the humanists had established themselves as the educators of upper classes in Italian city-states.

After these new translations, numerous commentaries were written on ethical and political Aristotelian writings, for instance by Donato Acciaiuoli (who dedicated his

⁴¹ G. Besso, B. Guagliumi, F. Pezzoli, *La riscoperta della «Politica» di Aristotele nell'Italia di età umanistico-rinascimentale tra interpretazione filologico-letteraria e filosofico-politica*, «Quaderni del Dipartimento di filologia A. Rostagn» n.s. 7 (2008), pp. 147–164.

commentary on the *Politics* to the Duke of Urbino, Federico da Montefeltro, in 1474)⁴². It is, finally, worth mentioning the completion of the treatise by the Italian professor Ciriaco Strozzi, in 1562: he composed a two-volume supplement to Aristotle's eight books of the *Politics* (dedicating it to Cosimo de' Medici), written in Greek and translated into Latin, in which he treated military, religious and civic powers, giving many historic examples of them.

As far as Book 8 is concerned⁴³, at the beginning of the Renaissance Aristotelian thought on music education (as well as on efficacy of music on the human soul) was reflected in the first attempts to institutionalize music teaching. In his *De regimine principum*⁴⁴ (a treatise dedicated to the education of the future King of France, Philip the Fair), Aegidius Romanus illustrated a program of music teaching for the Prince which was based just on the Aristotelian model (maybe it is not a coincidence that the first pieces of evidence on a singing school at the French court chapel go back just to this time). Moreover, Bruni's translation certainly exerted a great influence on Pope Eugene IV in his plan of establishing, between 1435 and 1442, the cathedral schools of chant and grammar in many Italian cities: Torino, Bologna, Firenze, Treviso, Padova, Urbino, Verona. In this respect, Book 8 of the *Politics* may be considered the theoretical foundation of music patronage developed between XIII and XIV century.

To conclude: if the paideutic program displayed by Aristotle was projected back towards the past, still focusing on the *polis* model, the impulse it gave centuries later to the European moulding of modern music teaching was conspicuous and innovative (although music will enter public education only in the XIX century)⁴⁵. The relationship between music education and society, however, and the link that had historically connected aesthetics with social needs —so deep in the Aristotelian thought— were progressively broken after him and replaced by other, different models.

⁴² Even if such a book was printed only much later: *In Aristotelis libros octos Politicorum commentarii*, Venezia 1566.

⁴³ F.A. Gallo, *L'ottavo libro della « Politica » di Aristotele: il testo e le traduzioni. Indagine preliminare sulle fonti (XIII-XV secolo)*, «Schede Medievali» 24–25 (1998), pp. 118–126.

⁴⁴ Roma 1607.

⁴⁵ Individual music instruction, instead, has traditions of practice which began to be formalized only in the nineteenth-century, with the advent of conservatoire teaching.